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1. Method
In this paper, we propose an improvement of Adversar-
ial Transformation Networks(ATN) [1]to generate adversar-
ial examples, which can fool white-box models and black-
box models with a state of the art performance and won
the SECOND place in the non-target task in CAAD 2018.
In this section, we first introduce the whole architecture
about our method, then we present our improvement on
loss functions to generate adversarial examples satisfying
the L∞ norm restriction in the non-targeted attack problem.
Then we illustrate how to use a robust-enhance module to
make our adversarial examples more robust and have better
transfer-ability. At last we will show our method on how to
attack an ensemble of models.
1.1. Model Architecture
Our work is based on ATN and propose a new training
framework and two powerful loss functions for improving
the transfer-ablity and training speed. Figer 1 shows our
framework
Our framework is composed by a Generate module and
a Robust-enhance module. In the Generate module, there
are the Encoder and Decoder just like the ATN. But before
feeding the clean image and adversarial example into the
pre-trained model, we add a Robust-enhance module to im-
itate the image pre-process used in some defence methods.
The generating part could be defined as a neural network:
gk,θ(x) : x ∈ χ→ x′ (1)
where θ is the parameter of g(x), k(x) is the target model
which outputs a probability distribution across class labels
and kf (x) is the feature map before the target model’s last
average pooling layer. x is the input image and χ is the
distribution domain of the input image, x′ is the adversarial
example generate by the g(x) and
argmax k(x) 6= argmax k(x′) (2)
1.2. Loss Function
With the L∞ norm restriction, we abandon the space-
domain loss and use the following loss functions to improve
performance.
Feature Based Loss function: inspired by the SRGAN [7]
and Guided denoise [8] , we use the target model’s feature
map before the last average pooling layer as the input im-
ages’ feature and try to maximum the L1 distance between
the feature of real image and the adversarial example.
lF (x, x
′) = 1− L1(kf (x), kf (x′)) (3)
We use this feature level loss function in the DLight
team’s attack model and got the third prize.
Prediction Based Loss function: we also concerned about
the loss based on the target model’s output and found a sim-
ple but powerful loss function.
lP (x, x
′) =
{
P ′fir − P ′sec, if argmax f(x) = fir
P ′sec − P ′fir, if argmax f(x) 6= fir
(4)
where for target model f withN class, it’s output prediction
f(x′) = [P ′1, P
′
2, . . . P
′
N ], we define fir and sec as labels
of the top two probabilities in f(x′) and Pfir and Psec are
their corresponding probabilities. In the following experi-
ments we will show that adversarial examples generated by
the model trained with this simple loss have strong transfer-
ability when comparing with other methods.
We use this loss function in the Hooin Zira’s submission
and won the second place in the Non-target attack competi-
tion.
1.3. Robust-enhance Module
As mentioned in 1.3, there are two main methods for
defending adversarial examples: adversarial training and
image pre-process. In order to attack the second defence
methods, we insert a Robust-enhance module in the training
process, after we get the output adversarial examples with
clip, we add this Robust-enhance module on the adversarial
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Figure 1. Architecture of our method
examples and feed the processed images to the following
target model. We find that with this Robust-enhance mod-
ule, our adversarial examples are more robust to the second
sort defence methods and get more powerful transfer-ability
when attacking models trained with the adversarial exam-
ples(first sort defence methods).
Considering about the implement of back propagation,
we use three basic image process in the Robust-enhance
module.
Random Noise: Add random noise.
Pre-trained Filter: We randomly use the Random Noise or
a small pre-trained filter network to process the adversarial
examples.
Training Filter:We randomly use the Random Noise or a
small pre-trained filter network to process the adversarial
examples, during training the Generate module, we also
train the filter.
1.4. Attacking ensemble of models
In this section, we show how to attack an ensemble of
models. Previous researches and competitions show that
ensemble methods is a efficient method for enhancing per-
formance and improve robustness in many area including
adversarial examples. Adversarial examples generated by
ensemble training are able to fool many white-box models
at the same time and have better transfer-ability to attack
black-box models.
We propose to attack multiple models by adding the
loss together and we call this ensemble in loss. As
our loss functions are defined in both feature level and
prediction level, this ensemble in loss method could easily
used with any kind of loss functions. When it comes to the
back propagation step, every loss will calculate gradients
individually and sum at each parameter. This will guide the
model to learn how to be more aggressive to all the target
models. Specifically, to attack an ensemble of N models,
we fuse the losses as
l(x) =
N∑
n=1
wnln(x) (5)
where ln(x) are the loss function of the n-th model, the loss
function here could be the feature based loss function or the
prediction based loss function wn is the ensemble weight
with wn > 0, we use it to keep balance of the gradients’
magnitude from different models.
Meanwhile, as show in Fig.1, we find when our adver-
sarial examples are adversarial to a model, it will be more
adversarial in a few iterations. In order to forbid our gen-
erate model tend to one of the target models, we add a
threshold γ for our prediction based loss lP and get new
loss lensP (x, x′):
lensP (x, x
′) = max(γ, lP (x, x′)) (6)
2. Experiments
In this section, in order to validate the effectiveness of
the proposed methods, we generate adversarial examples
for fooling classifiers pre-trained on the ImageNet dataset
[2] , which consist of 1.2 million natural images collected
from Internet and categorized into 1000 classes. We first
specify the experimental settings in Sec.4.1. Then we show
the results for attacking a single model in Sec.4.2 and an
ensemble of model in Sec.4.3.
2.1. Experiment setting
We use eleven models, nine of which are nor-
mally trained models–Inception V3(Inc-v3)[11], In-
ception V4(Inc-v4)[10], Inception Resnet V2(IncRes
V2)[10], Resnet V2-101(Res-101) [4] , PolyNet[13],
SENet154(SENet)[5],PNASNet 5-Large(PNASNet)[9],
NASNet-A-Large(NASNet)[14], DenseNet 121(Den-
121)[6]. In order to avoid the evaluate result influenced
by resize operation and easy for the ensemble models
training, we fine-tune all the models with a 299× 299 input
by modify the pooling size of last average pooling layer.
the other twp models are trained by ensemble adversarial
training—Inc-v3ens3,Inc-v3ens4, as we don’t have enough
time and resources for prepare these models, we used the
models shared by 1 and transfer them from tensorflow
model to pytorch model with2.
1https://github.com/dongyp13/Non-Targeted-Adversarial-Attacks
2https://github.com/Microsoft/MMdnn
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Attack Inc-v3 Inc-v4 IncRes-v2 PolyNet NasNet Res-101 Inc-v3ens3 Inc-v3ens4 Mean
FGSM 0.71 0.24 0.23 0.37 0.18 0.34 0.13 0.11 0.22
PGD 0.99 0.18 0.12 0.22 0.09 0.18 0.11 0.07 0.14
MI-FGSM 0.99 0.42 0.38 0.46 0.23 0.44 0.13 0.11 0.31
F-ATN(No Robust) 0.91 0.63 0.59 0.69 0.47 0.65 0.28 0.27 0.51
F-ATN 0.91 0.69 0.6 0.74 0.51 0.76 0.30 0.29 0.55
P-ATN(No Robust) 0.98 0.97 0.92 0.96 0.91 0.93 0.58 0.47 0.82
P-ATN 0.97 0.97 0.93 0.96 0.89 0.94 0.83 0.80 0.90
Table 1. Results for single model attack. Inc-v3 is the target white-box model and others are black-box models. We compare our methods P-
ATN, F-ATN with FGSM, PGD and MI-FGSM, we find our method have a similar performance comparing with start of the art method MI-
FGSM on white-box attack and have a much higher fooling rate when attacking black-box models. We also test the performance of Robust-
enhance module, P-ATN(No Robust) and F-ATN(No Robust) show the fooling rate of model without Robust-enhance module during
training, results shows that with Robust-enhance module, P-ATN’s performance have a great progress when attacking black-box models,
but F-ATN only have a small improvement. The last row shows the average black-box fooling rate, P-ATN have the best performance
As we focus on fooling the target white or black box
models, we use the fooling rate instead of the attack suc-
cess rate. We define the fooling rate as how many adversar-
ial examples’ prediction labels are different from the origin
images’ prediction label. Because the classifier is not cor-
rect for all the input, in most cases, the attack success rate
is higher than the fooling rate. We use the DEV imageset
released by CAAD to test all of our methods.
In our experiments, we compare our methods to
FGSM[3] (one-step gradient-based) methods, MI-FGSM
(iterative methods) and PGD[12](iterative methods). Mean-
while we also compare with the method we followed —
ATN(based on Autoencoder), as ATN’s loss function is de-
signed for targeted attack, we modify the loss for non-
targeted by minimize the true label’s prediction. Since
optimization-based methods cannot explicitly control the
distance between the adversarial examples and the corre-
sponding real images, we don’t compare with these meth-
ods.
2.2. Attacking a single model
We show the fooling rates of attacks against the models
we consider in Sec.4.1 in Table 1. The adversarial examples
are generated for Inc-v3 useing FGSM, MI-FGSM and PGD
and four of our methods:feature loss based ATN(F-ATN),
prediction loss based ATN(P-ATN) and both of the mod-
els without the Robust-enhance module. Inc-v4, IncRes-
v2, PolyNet, NasNet, Res-101, Inc-v3ens3, Inc-v3ens4 are
black-box models for evaluate transfer-ability of all the
methods.The maximum perturbation  is set to 16 among
all experiments, with pixel value in [0,255]. The number of
iterations is 10 for MIM-FGSM, and the decay factor µ is
1.0 as used in MIM. The noise mean factor β is 6 in both
P-ATN and F-ATN
From the table we can observe that our two models could
attack the white-box model with a near 100% fooling rate
like MI-FGSM and better than FGSM and PGD. But when
Roubst method Inc-v3 Inc-v3ens3 Inc-v3ens4
None 0.98 0.58 0.47
Random Noise 0.97 0.83 0.80
Pre-trained Filter 0.97 0.43 0.56
Training Filter 0.97 0.59 0.43
Table 2. Results.
it comes to the black-box attack, it can be seen that the
performance of FGSM, MI-FGSM and PGD are decrease
largely, especially when attacking the adversarial trained
models Inc-v3ens3 and Inc-v3ens4, all of the three attack
is powerless. But with Robust-enhance module, both of our
F-ATN and P-ATN still keep a high fooling rate. The last
row of Table 1 shows the average black-box fooling rate,
P-ATN have the best performance.
Meanwhile, We also test the performance of Robust-
enhance module, P-ATN(No Robust) and F-ATN(No Ro-
bust) show the fooling rate of model without Robust-
enhance module during training, results show that with
Robust-enhance module, P-ATN’s performance have a great
progress when attacking black-box models, but F-ATN only
have a small improvement.
Although our method improve the success rates greatly
for black-box attack even the target is adversarial trained,
the performance is not good enough(less than 90%), we will
show that with muti-model ensemble training, our methods
will get a better result.
2.2.1 Performance related with Robust-enhance mod-
ule
The Robust-enhance module is the most important part
for improving our model’s transfer-ability and robustness.
Therefore, we study the difference between the Random
Noise method, Pretrain Filter method and Maxmin Filter
method.
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Attack Resize Inc-v3 IncRes-v2 Res-101
FGSM N 0.71 0.28 0.34
FGSM Y 0.46 0.21 0.30
PGD N 0.99 0.12 0.18
PGD Y 0.36 0.09 0.13
MI-FGSM N 0.99 0.38 0.45
MI-FGSM Y 0.63 0.25 0.34
P-ATN N 0.97 0.93 0.95
P-ATN Y 0.54 0.34 0.72
Table 3. Results. Ours is better.
Figure 2.
We attack Inc-V3 model by P-ATN with three only ran-
dom noise method, pretrained filer combine with noise and
Maxmin method. For the noise method, the noise max mean
factor β is 6. We show the fooling rate of the generated ad-
versarial examples against Inc-v3, Inc-v3ens3, Inc-v3ens4
in Table 2. Table 2 shows the result of different methods
and random noise is the best one.
2.2.2 Performance on attacking model with image re-
size
We then study the adversarial examples’ robustness when
the black-box model use some image preprocess methods
to defence attack. We use the same hyper-parameters for
all the attack methods as Sec.4.2, and before we feed the
adversarial examples to the target model, we resize it from
299 to 399, then from 399 to 199, finally we resize it back
to 299. And the attack performance shows in Table 3.
The result shows that after the resize option, all the attack
performance for white-box attack(Inc-v3) decrease, espe-
cially our methods. As for black-box attack(IncRes-v2 and
Res-101) results, the gradients based methods’ performance
just have a slightly decrease and our method’s fooling rate
are influenced seriously, but still better than other methods.
Attack IncRes-v2 Inc-v3ens3
MI-FGSM 0.955 0.949
F-ATN 0.971 0.963
P-ATN 0.998 0.997
Table 4. Results.
2.2.3 Performance related with size of perturbation
We finally study the influence of the size of adversarial per-
turbation on the fooling rates. We attack the Inc-v3 model
by P-ATN and MI-FGSM with  from 1 to 32 with a granu-
larity 4 and the pixels range is [0,255]. We evaluate the at-
tack performance on white-box model Inc-v3, a black-box
model IncRes V2. For P-ATN, we use Random Noise mod-
ule with β = 6 and step size α for PGD and MI-FGSM is
10. As it cost many time for training P-ATN with different
epsilon, we just train the model with epsilon 4,8,16,32 and
clip to generate different perturbation.
Figer. 2 show the result. We find that when attacking
white-box model Inc-v3, MI-FGSM keeps a high fooling
rate for all the epsilon. When the epsilon is small(2,4,6),
P-ATN have a poor performance, with the epsilon grow,
the fooling rate reach 100%. When attacking the black-
box model, fooling rate of MI-FGSM grow linearly with
the size of perturbation, and P-ATN’s fooling rate grow ex-
ponentially, when the epsilon is large than 8, P-ATN got a
better performance and as last reach 99%.
2.3. Competition by ensemble of models
There are three sub-competitions in Competition on
Adversarial Attacks and Defenses 2018 organized by
GeekPwn, which are the Non-targeted Adversarial Attack,
Targeted Adversarial Attack and Defense Against Adver-
sarial Attack. The organizers provide 1000 ImageNet-
compatible images for evaluating the attack and defense
submissions. in the non-targeted attack, we won the sec-
ond place by P-ATN and third place by F-ATN.
For both of the network, we used ten pretrained models
mentioned in Sec4.1 except Inc-v3. and Robust-enhance
module. The noise mean factor β is 6 in both P-ATN and
F-ATN and we set the ensemble threshold factor γ as −0.9.
For PolyNet and Inc-v3ens3, we set the weight as 0.5 and
the rest Inc-v3ens4, Inc-v4, IncRes V2, Res-101, SENet,
PNASNet, NASNet and Den-121, we set the weight as 1.0.
Table 4 shows the performance comparing with last year’s
winner’s submission .
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